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Abstract. This paper reports on work in applying ideas from the ABZ world to modern
cryptographic protocols. It describes the important differences between this and more
“traditional” application areas, and a number of promising approaches in formal methods.
Disclaimer
The nature of this paper is such that a bibliography giving decent coverage of the problems raised and
attempted solutions from both sides of the fence would take up more than the total space available
here – the reader is invited to look elsewhere, e.g. papers and research proposals at [5].
1 Natural Bedfellows?
At a first glance, cryptographic protocols provide exactly the kind of problems that formal
methods are most suitable for and perform best at: short programs (most fit on a single page),
based on rich algebraic mathematics, whose correctness is highly critical. However, the mathe-
matics and the notions of security (correctness) are very different from the usual formal methods
assortment.
2 Three Steps from the Ideal
Formal methods is about achieving correct systems. Ideally [12, 1], this correctness is achieved
by construction: we use a “wide spectrum” language that encompasses both abstract specifi-
cations and executable programs, and transform one gradually into the other through small
“correctness-preserving” steps. Refinement as a process, if you like, with the domain algebra,
the properties of the problem, and a little creativity guiding us in creating a solution.
Slightly less desirable is post-hoc verification: proving that a proposed implementation is
correct with respect to a specification (refinement as a relation), or that it satisfies certain
properties. In the latter case, implementations and their properties may even be written in
different languages.
If, given a specification and its intended solution, our mathematical framework does not
help us in proving that it is correct, the next level is proof-checking. I.e., if someone comes
along with a proof of correctness, we can formalise this, and then check mechanically that it
discharges our overall proof obligation.
For modern cryptographic protocols (see below for what I mean by that), the state of the
art is that proofs and proof methods are often insufficiently formalised for even proof checking
to be a realistic prospective. So we are a full three steps away from the ideal way of achieving
correctness.
3 Formal Methods and Cryptography
In the 1990s, formal methods techniques achieved major success in the modelling and analysis
of cryptographic protocols, particularly work by the group using CSP around Oxford [9, 15] and
by Paulson [13]. First, by considering non-deterministic choices of actions by the attacker, they
allowed abstraction from attack strategies (and took anthropomorphism out of the equation:
non-determinism encompasses “evil”). The second important aspect of this work was automa-
tion: using the theorem prover Isabelle in Paulson’s work, and using CASPER and the FDR1
model checker in case of the Oxford group. However, this work was based on an abstraction of
encryption which is an approximation. (Basically, the initial algebra assumption for encryption
as the main constructor – implying an infinite algebra when all practical schemes work with
fixed length bitstrings.) Thus, it may lead to false assurances of security. Also its emphasis on
absolute notions of security does not sit well with modern cryptology.
4 Modern Cryptographic Protocols and Security
A modern cryptographic protocol may have the following properties:
– although its functionality is clear, its full set of desirable security properties may not be
known yet;
– it contains explicit probabilistic elements, to mask input distributions and in “nonces”;
– its notion of security (correctness) is not an absolute one but approximate;
– moreover, this approximate correctness is relative to the computational resources available
for an attack against it (which tends to imply an implicit probabilistic aspect);
– its security is not proved in an absolute sense but relative to the hardness of some compu-
tational problem;
– it uses primitives in a way which does not guarantee compositionality of the primitives’
properties.
All this means that the standard techniques and good intentions of formal methods do not work
straight out of the box.
Many approaches to bridging the gap between formal methods and modern cryptography
exist – see for example [4, 14, 7, 11, 8, 3]. These all have their advantages and disadvantages –
but none are too close in spirit to the ABZ world.
5 What Do We Need, and What Has Been Done
Finally, I take a “bottom-up” view of how the ABZ world might approach the problem of
“refinement for cryptographic protocols”: in which dimensions we would need to extend (say)
standard Z states-and-operations refinement. This includes the following:
approximation Notions of correctness which are not exact but “close enough” – approximate
refinement [6] would need to be strengthened to include fast convergence (“negligibility”).
The cryptographic primitive of commitment, for example, requires two security properties
– achieving both simultaneously is impossible, but schemes exist which approximate both
with only negligible error.
probability Possibly protocols, and certainly attack models have a probabilistic element (“guess-
ing”) to them. The work by McIver and Morgan [10] is a massive step forward in this area,
and work on probabilistic refinement is continuing in several groups. Mingsheng Ying [16]
has considered approximate probabilistic refinement.
action refinement Typical cryptographic protocols achieve a single objective through multi-
ple communications between the parties involved. Thus, the granularity of actions decreases
going from specification to implementation, requiring some kind of action refinement. Re-
cent work by Banach and Schellhorn [2] is beginning to clarify issues of stutttering and
upward vs. downward simulation in this area.
1 The FDR tool is c©Formal Systems (Europe) Ltd.
attacks Protocols do not operate in isolation: multiple instances may run concurrently between
different parties, and “dishonest” participants may not stick to the protocol. In the CSP
work described above, this was modelled using non-deterministic choice over messages on a
broadcast channel – is there an abstract data type analogue for this, and how do we model
the limited (“polynomial”) computing resources of such dishonest parties?
partwise and compositionality Refinement is monotonic with respect to most of the spec-
ification operators we use, allowing us to apply decomposition and partwise refinement.
Approximation puts this under threat, and intuitively sensible notions of compositionality
(e.g. [7]) have been shown to be unachievable for important cryptographic primitives.
All of this makes up a large research agenda to chip away at. Watch this space for a planned
new EPSRC Network and new research in several of these areas.
References
1. R. Backhouse. Program Construction: Calculating Implementations from Specifications. Wiley,
2003.
2. R. Banach and G. Schellhorn. On the refinement of atomic actions. ENTCS, 201:3–30, 2008.
Proceedings BCS-FACS Refinement Workshop 2007.
3. M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based
game-playing proofs. In S. Vaudenay, editor, EUROCRYPT, volume 4004 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, pages 409–426. Springer, 2006.
4. B. Blanchet and D. Pointcheval. Automated security proofs with sequences of games. In C. Dwork,
editor, CRYPTO’06, volume 4117 of Lecture Notes on Computer Science, pages 537–554, Santa
Barbara, CA, August 2006. Springer Verlag.
5. E.A. Boiten. Cryptography and formal methods project website.
www.cs.kent.ac.uk/~eab2/crypto/
6. E.A. Boiten and J. Derrick. Formal program development with approximations. In H. Treharne,
S. King, M. Henson, and S. Schneider, editors, ZB 2005, volume 3455 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 375–393. Springer, 2005.
7. R. Canetti. Universally composable security: A new paradigm for cryptographic protocols. Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2000/067, 2000.
8. A. Datta, A. Derek, J.C. Mitchell, V. Shmatikov, and M. Turuani. Probabilistic polynomial-time
semantics for a protocol security logic. In ICALP, pages 16–29, 2005.
9. G. Lowe. Breaking and fixing the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol using FDR. In T. Mar-
garia and B. Steffen, editors, TACAS, volume 1055 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
147–166. Springer, 1996.
10. A. McIver and C. Morgan. Abstraction, Refinement and Proof for Probabilistic Systems. Springer,
2004.
11. D. Micciancio and B. Warinschi. Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adver-
saries. In M. Naor, editor, Theory of cryptography conference - Proceedings of TCC 2004, volume
2951 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 133–151, Cambridge, MA, USA, February 2004.
Springer.
12. C. C. Morgan. Programming from Specifications. International Series in Computer Science. Prentice
Hall, 2nd edition, 1994.
13. L.C. Paulson. The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols. Journal of Computer
Security, 6(1-2):85–128, 1998.
14. B. Pfitzmann and M. Waidner. Composition and integrity preservation of secure reactive systems.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 245–254, 2000.
15. P. Ryan, S. Schneider, M. Goldsmith, G. Lowe, and A.W. Roscoe. Modelling and Analysis of
Security Protocols. Addison-Wesley, 2001.
16. M. Ying. Reasoning about probabilistic sequential programs in a probabilistic logic. Acta Infor-
matica, 39(5):315–389, 2003.
